Publications
2016. "'Take It Outside!' National Identity Contestation in the Foreign Policy Arena," in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 2.
Turkey’s Islamist-rooted Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) aggressively pursued European Union accession as a primary pillar of foreign policy, only to swing sharply away from the West in subsequent years. Actor- and party-based Islamist identity approaches cannot account for Turkey’s initial European Union-centric orientation, while domestic politics and economic arguments fail to explain the timing of the shift eastward and its domestic repercussions. Examining the advantages that foreign policy offers as an alternative arena in which elites can politicize identity debates helps to distill this complexity. This article argues that elites choose to take their national identity contests to the foreign policy arena when identity gambits at the domestic level are blocked. By taking its pursuit of hegemony for Ottoman Islamism “outside” through aggressive European Union accession measures, the Justice and Development Party could weaken domestic challengers supporting a competing, Republican Nationalist proposal for identity, and broaden support for Ottoman Islamism at home. The theory of identity hegemony developed here thus explains the counter-intuitive finding that Turkey’s European Union-oriented policy helped make possible the rise of Ottoman Islamism. Turkey offers an ideal empirical window onto these dynamics because of recent and dramatic shifts in the dynamics of its public identity debates, and because Turkey’s identity is implicated in multiple international roles, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, European Union candidate country, Organization of Islamic Cooperation member, and aspirant regional power broker. The framework developed fills a gap in existing scholarship by closing the identity–foreign policy circle, analytically linking the spillover of national identity debates into foreign policy with the changes in the contours of these debates produced by their contestation in this alternative arena.
Turkey’s Islamist-rooted Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) aggressively pursued European Union accession as a primary pillar of foreign policy, only to swing sharply away from the West in subsequent years. Actor- and party-based Islamist identity approaches cannot account for Turkey’s initial European Union-centric orientation, while domestic politics and economic arguments fail to explain the timing of the shift eastward and its domestic repercussions. Examining the advantages that foreign policy offers as an alternative arena in which elites can politicize identity debates helps to distill this complexity. This article argues that elites choose to take their national identity contests to the foreign policy arena when identity gambits at the domestic level are blocked. By taking its pursuit of hegemony for Ottoman Islamism “outside” through aggressive European Union accession measures, the Justice and Development Party could weaken domestic challengers supporting a competing, Republican Nationalist proposal for identity, and broaden support for Ottoman Islamism at home. The theory of identity hegemony developed here thus explains the counter-intuitive finding that Turkey’s European Union-oriented policy helped make possible the rise of Ottoman Islamism. Turkey offers an ideal empirical window onto these dynamics because of recent and dramatic shifts in the dynamics of its public identity debates, and because Turkey’s identity is implicated in multiple international roles, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, European Union candidate country, Organization of Islamic Cooperation member, and aspirant regional power broker. The framework developed fills a gap in existing scholarship by closing the identity–foreign policy circle, analytically linking the spillover of national identity debates into foreign policy with the changes in the contours of these debates produced by their contestation in this alternative arena.
2016. "Adding Insult to Injury: Vilification as Counter-Mobilization Strategy in Turkey's Gezi Protests," Paper Series for Project on Middle East Political Science, June 6.
The timing, extent and nature of the anti-government uprisings collectively known as Turkey’s 2013 Gezi Protests came as a shock to even the most diligent Turkey observer. Electorally speaking, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) had faced little in terms of serious political competition throughout its first three terms in power, increasing its share of the vote and its seats in parliament in each general election since achieving its first parliamentary majority in 2002 as a newly formed party. While the AKP had been electorally successful up to May 2013, the events comprising the Gezi Protests made it abundantly clear that many of Turkey’s citizens did not support the party’s increasing consolidation of power and tendency towards rhetoric rooted in appeals to Islam. Previously politically apathetic individuals, including huge swathes of Turkey’s youth, turned out in the millions to voice their criticism of the government, its illiberal actions, and the policies AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hoped would contribute to raising a “pious” (dindar) generation. As widespread, broad-based, internationally supported, and emotionally charged as the Gezi Protests were, however, they fizzled out relatively quickly, and ultimately produced no lasting political change. How is this possible? This paper explores the counter-mobilization strategy of vilification the AKP government used to marginalize and delegitimize Gezi protesters and their grievances. To account for the government’s success in quashing the seemingly indefatigable spirit and massive numbers of protesters in the face of brutal violence, I demonstrate how the AKP literally added insult to injury to demobilize and discredit its opposition. To do so, and to contribute to wider discussions of effectiveness in counter-mobilization, I identify and explore three mechanisms of rhetorical vilification: naming, blaming, and framing.
The timing, extent and nature of the anti-government uprisings collectively known as Turkey’s 2013 Gezi Protests came as a shock to even the most diligent Turkey observer. Electorally speaking, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) had faced little in terms of serious political competition throughout its first three terms in power, increasing its share of the vote and its seats in parliament in each general election since achieving its first parliamentary majority in 2002 as a newly formed party. While the AKP had been electorally successful up to May 2013, the events comprising the Gezi Protests made it abundantly clear that many of Turkey’s citizens did not support the party’s increasing consolidation of power and tendency towards rhetoric rooted in appeals to Islam. Previously politically apathetic individuals, including huge swathes of Turkey’s youth, turned out in the millions to voice their criticism of the government, its illiberal actions, and the policies AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hoped would contribute to raising a “pious” (dindar) generation. As widespread, broad-based, internationally supported, and emotionally charged as the Gezi Protests were, however, they fizzled out relatively quickly, and ultimately produced no lasting political change. How is this possible? This paper explores the counter-mobilization strategy of vilification the AKP government used to marginalize and delegitimize Gezi protesters and their grievances. To account for the government’s success in quashing the seemingly indefatigable spirit and massive numbers of protesters in the face of brutal violence, I demonstrate how the AKP literally added insult to injury to demobilize and discredit its opposition. To do so, and to contribute to wider discussions of effectiveness in counter-mobilization, I identify and explore three mechanisms of rhetorical vilification: naming, blaming, and framing.
2016. "Mapping the Dynamics of Identity Contestation: Hybridization, Polarization, and Self-Marginalization," Cornell University's Einaudi Center for International Studies Paper Series, 6 June.
This paper is part of a larger project that forays into the murky waters of sub-national identity contestation, understood here as struggles among members of a state’s population who support competing various proposals for the content of that state’s national identity. The paper attempts to capture these contours, map their shifts, and parse out the mechanisms by which these changes occur in Turkey, a state with multiple, politically salient identity cleavages. To do so, the paper analyzes these three key episodes that each constitute major challenges to the ruling party’s pursuit of identity hegemony for its own proposal of Ottoman Islamism. Each of these challenges shaping the contours of Turkey’s identity debates over the course of just two years (May 2013 – May 2015) represents a different dynamic of identity contestation: hybridization of opposition demonstrators during the Gezi Protests, polarization among supporters of the AKP and the Gülen Movement, and self-marginalization of the AKP through its increasingly radical rhetoric. Drawing from a wide array of popular culture and social media sources as well as interviews, surveys, and participant observation, the analysis provides new insight into the vernacular politics of identity in contemporary Turkey, while contributing to wider studies of social movements and contentious politics through its examination of various mechanisms of change
This paper is part of a larger project that forays into the murky waters of sub-national identity contestation, understood here as struggles among members of a state’s population who support competing various proposals for the content of that state’s national identity. The paper attempts to capture these contours, map their shifts, and parse out the mechanisms by which these changes occur in Turkey, a state with multiple, politically salient identity cleavages. To do so, the paper analyzes these three key episodes that each constitute major challenges to the ruling party’s pursuit of identity hegemony for its own proposal of Ottoman Islamism. Each of these challenges shaping the contours of Turkey’s identity debates over the course of just two years (May 2013 – May 2015) represents a different dynamic of identity contestation: hybridization of opposition demonstrators during the Gezi Protests, polarization among supporters of the AKP and the Gülen Movement, and self-marginalization of the AKP through its increasingly radical rhetoric. Drawing from a wide array of popular culture and social media sources as well as interviews, surveys, and participant observation, the analysis provides new insight into the vernacular politics of identity in contemporary Turkey, while contributing to wider studies of social movements and contentious politics through its examination of various mechanisms of change
2013. "Us v. Them, Over and Over Again? National Identity Contestation in Turkey's Stalled EU Bid," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1.
This article argues that a central reason for Turkey’s EU stalemate can be located in domestic debates over what constitutes an appropriate definition of Turkish national identity. Three oft-cited understandings of Turkish identity –Pan-Turkism, Kemalism, and Islamist Ottoman-nationalism– all have components that are incompatible with EU accession criteria. This article demonstrates how each understanding of “Turkishness” has obstructed Turkey’s EU membership bid for in its own way. Underlining that identities have an inherent capacity for change, however, the article argues that Turkey’s seemingly ossified “Us v. Them” relations at both the domestic and international levels contain the potential for reconciliation.
This article argues that a central reason for Turkey’s EU stalemate can be located in domestic debates over what constitutes an appropriate definition of Turkish national identity. Three oft-cited understandings of Turkish identity –Pan-Turkism, Kemalism, and Islamist Ottoman-nationalism– all have components that are incompatible with EU accession criteria. This article demonstrates how each understanding of “Turkishness” has obstructed Turkey’s EU membership bid for in its own way. Underlining that identities have an inherent capacity for change, however, the article argues that Turkey’s seemingly ossified “Us v. Them” relations at both the domestic and international levels contain the potential for reconciliation.
2011. "Explaining Democratic Failure in the Post-Soviet Space," The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, December.
The electoral revolutions that swept through former communist states in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space in the late 1990s and early 2000s initially provoked great optimism regarding the democratic potential for the region. However, the regimes that emerged from these recent electoral revolutions are far from uniformly democratic. This article argues that the lack of cohesion among elites leading the electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine substantially shaped the outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule following these electoral revolutions. Without the cohesion necessary to resolve intra-elite disputes over policy and power-sharing, elites previously willing to work together toward winning power no longer shared a common goal. Thus, the loose coalitions that led the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine split shortly after coming to power, leaving democratic vacuums in their wake: the regimes of these three states currently represent relatively unconstrained presidentialism and the electoral success of a former authoritarian leader, respectively. Simply put, in a transition in which a high degree of cohesion among elites was present prior to the electoral revolution, the regime produced in the transition from authoritarianism was more democratic; conversely, those revolutions led by elites who were loosely united behind the sole purpose of achieving electoral victory tended to produce “hybrid regimes,” which retained elements of authoritarian rule.
The electoral revolutions that swept through former communist states in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space in the late 1990s and early 2000s initially provoked great optimism regarding the democratic potential for the region. However, the regimes that emerged from these recent electoral revolutions are far from uniformly democratic. This article argues that the lack of cohesion among elites leading the electoral revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine substantially shaped the outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule following these electoral revolutions. Without the cohesion necessary to resolve intra-elite disputes over policy and power-sharing, elites previously willing to work together toward winning power no longer shared a common goal. Thus, the loose coalitions that led the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine split shortly after coming to power, leaving democratic vacuums in their wake: the regimes of these three states currently represent relatively unconstrained presidentialism and the electoral success of a former authoritarian leader, respectively. Simply put, in a transition in which a high degree of cohesion among elites was present prior to the electoral revolution, the regime produced in the transition from authoritarianism was more democratic; conversely, those revolutions led by elites who were loosely united behind the sole purpose of achieving electoral victory tended to produce “hybrid regimes,” which retained elements of authoritarian rule.
2006. Problematizing State-Centricity. Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees," BSIS Journal of International Studies, Vol. 3.
Among the many debates grappling their way to the forefront of what constitutes the discourse of International Relations scholarship is the highly contested level-of-analysis problem. In one of the primary contributions to this melee, J. David Singer reminds us that, before formulating scientific theory in any discipline, an observer must first choose how to observe; we may, as he explains, choose to focus “upon the parts or upon the whole...the trees or the forest.” Missing in Singer’s counsel to would-be theorists, however, is a definitive position on whether explanatory power may be sacrificed, even at the systemic level, by a limited definition of the actors which are included in analysis of the system. A reformulation of Singer’s analogy could then be: Might we lose sight of the forest by examining only trees? Do we lose a sense of the whole with a limited conception of the unit? In this essay, I investigate the limitations to theoretical explanatory power that are imposed by a state-centric approach to the international system. By pointing to examples of transnational actors and failed states, I elucidate the importance of non-state or ‘failed state’ actors in transforming and constructing the international system – thus diverging from Wendt’s, albeit constructivist, state-centric approach to IR theory. In conclusion, I suggest implications that a pluralistic, and hence more comprehensive, conception of world actors may have for our understanding of the international system as a whole._
Among the many debates grappling their way to the forefront of what constitutes the discourse of International Relations scholarship is the highly contested level-of-analysis problem. In one of the primary contributions to this melee, J. David Singer reminds us that, before formulating scientific theory in any discipline, an observer must first choose how to observe; we may, as he explains, choose to focus “upon the parts or upon the whole...the trees or the forest.” Missing in Singer’s counsel to would-be theorists, however, is a definitive position on whether explanatory power may be sacrificed, even at the systemic level, by a limited definition of the actors which are included in analysis of the system. A reformulation of Singer’s analogy could then be: Might we lose sight of the forest by examining only trees? Do we lose a sense of the whole with a limited conception of the unit? In this essay, I investigate the limitations to theoretical explanatory power that are imposed by a state-centric approach to the international system. By pointing to examples of transnational actors and failed states, I elucidate the importance of non-state or ‘failed state’ actors in transforming and constructing the international system – thus diverging from Wendt’s, albeit constructivist, state-centric approach to IR theory. In conclusion, I suggest implications that a pluralistic, and hence more comprehensive, conception of world actors may have for our understanding of the international system as a whole._